This article pursues two main objectives. First 
Introduction
For forty years or more before the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year old Tunisian street vendor, in December last year symbolically triggered the stunning wave of popular upheavals that swept the Arab world, there had been little indication that the political landscape of the region would be shaken up so dramatically by the train of political unrest still unfolding. As the year 2010 drew to its end, the region seemed politically stable, with its decades-long authoritarian regimes firmly holding onto their power, and politically silenced populations striving to live with widespread economic and political malaises. 1 However, the desperate act of Bouazizi in the peripheral Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid first ignited a countrywide popular unrest, leading to the ouster of Abidine Ben Ali and his 23-year rule on 14 January 2011, and then inspired a wave of region-wide protests which have irreversibly transformed the Middle East, but also produced tremendous uncertainty regarding political transition and social cohesion after the uprisings. Therefore, "comparisons of the 'Arab spring' to the end of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989" seem premature. 2 Up until now, six out of the 22 members of the Arab league -Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain -have undergone full-scale upheavals, leading either to the deposition of their dictators or to severe domestic fracturing and struggle, and these are distinguished from the rest of the region, which has seen relatively more limited forms of protests. Of the first six countries to experience uprisings, none can yet be said precisely to have had a successful revolution in real terms, leading to a genuinely democratic political system. In Tunisia and Egypt, popular insurrections resulted in the ousting of authoritarian leaders, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, respectively, but the uncertainties and perils of transition are continuing, given their long roads to democracy and the longstanding economic difficulties they are faced with. 3 In Libya, the popular movement erupted in the eastern city of Benghazi and then escalated into a civil war between groups of anti-government protesters and Gadhafi's forces which ultimately drew in the NATO military campaign, bringing the end of Gaddafi`s 42 years of autocracy, but leaving uncertainty and a fragmented security landscape that revealed itself as a reflection of distrust among new actors. 4 In Bahrain, following a failed dialogue with protesters, the Sunni-minority ruling Khalifa royal family aggressively suppressed uprisings with a violent crackdown supported by the military arm of the GCC which "has bought neither significant time, nor social peace or stability" but has sharpened sectarian polarisation, and this is likely to reemerge in more assertive ways if the grievances continue to be ignored by the regime. 5 Among other countries experiencing severe political turmoil, the situation in Syria has gradually deteriorated with the escalating repression by the security forces and the rising number of civilian causalities since the uprising began. The political crisis in Yemen has also not abated, even after the end of Ali Abdullah Saleh's 33-year rule, which merely set the stage for the transfer of power but created even more uncertainty regarding Yemen's southern question and the potential risk of an escalation in the Salafi-Shiite conflict. It seems that more severe political turmoil and violent conflict is not off the political agenda of the latter two cases in the forthcoming months. 6 Other parts of the region have experienced relatively more limited forms of protests. The GCC states, with the exception of Bahrain, have faced relatively small-scale protests which did not coalesce into a country-wide movement for social change. While in Morocco and Jordan, the ruling monarchs have undertaken reforms measures to prevent further political upheavals, in Saudi Arabia the regime raised social welfare spending and applied more repressive measures against protests primarily confined to the eastern province. 7 As many scholars 8 have pointed out, at least for now, it seems difficult to fully and satisfactorily explain the timing and immediate causes of the events, given the still unsettled dust and uncertainty surrounding their emergence, dating back less than one and a half years. However, to a considerable extent, it is possible to explain the longstanding driving factors behind the protest movement and why some uprisings have succeeded in toppling regimes, and others have not. Despite the defensibility of popular claims, particularly in non-academic circles, that the
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widespread use of social media and modern information and communication technologies (ICT) such as satellite television and the internet has sparked the revolutions and facilitated the mobilisation of rioters, this does not seem to be self-evidently the case and has little to do with the underlying the economic and political roots of the uprisings. 9 In fact, as a range of diverse but interconnected events have developed in distinct ways in particular places, it appears that the uprisings across the region were motivated by similar sets of socio-economic problems and political grievances, but that the outcomes vary from country to country according to the role of security forces, the ethnic and sectarian makeup of the society and the politico-institutional feature of the regimes. Nevertheless, thinking about the Arab Spring as an interconnected series of events derived from shared economic grievances and a call for personal dignity, freedom and responsive governance may pose two main limitations. Firstly, by inclining researchers to survey for a common casual explanation of the events, it may preclude taking into account the profoundly divergent causes, socio-political and socio-economic contexts and outcomes of the Arab uprisings of 2011. Secondly, it may also prevent the classification of these developments into other relevant and broader contexts of crisis and contention such as the Mediterranean, European or even the global protests that also occurred in 2011. 10 Building on all these accounts and limitations, this article argues that rather than a single driving factor, a set of longstanding socio-economic and socio-political problems afflicting the Arab world for nearly half a century has constituted a common casual motivation behind the uprisings, whose outcomes have varied from country to country depending on a combination of factors, such as government responses, the role of security forces, foreign intervention, the ethnic and sectarian makeup of the affected societies and the politico-institutional characteristics of state structure. In parallel with this argument, the article pursues two objectives. First, mainly drawing on empirical evidences rather than journalistic impressions and reports on the uprisings, it aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the sets of socio-economic and socio-political factors that have been deeply rooted in the region for more than half a century and which have driven (and continue to drive) a wave of uprisings across the region commonly labelled as the 'Arab Spring'. In so doing, the article presents a slightly different reading of the events by placing the issues into more socio-economic and socio-political contexts of the recent past. Secondly, by considering the responses of the regimes, the role of security forces, the ethnic and sectarian makeup of the societies and the politico-institutional feature of states, it explains how the unfolding of events has differed from country to country and why some uprisings have succeeded in toppling regimes and others have not.
Roots of Discontent and the Dynamics of the Arab Spring
To be sure, the uprisings across the region, regardless of their subsequent developments, have had much in common in terms of their motivations. In fact, an explosive combination of factors have constituted a common causal motivation behind all of the uprisings, comprising issues such as high unemployment, particularly among youth, rising social inequalities, rampant government corruption, clientialism, the assault on human dignity, the denial of basic rights by regimes, the lack of liberal values, the change of demographic profiles in the last few decades and a further deterioration of economies due to the global financial crisis and food price increases. Above all, to a considerable extent two popular grievances -the deteriorating economy conditions and the yearning for dignity and freedom -seem to have played a relatively significant role in triggering the popular unrest across the region. 11 In an economic sense, although poverty and relatively low economic growth rates have been among the region's prominent economic predicaments even for oil-producing countries like Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Iraq, in absolute terms, they do not have explanatory power per se. Rather, more complex and longstanding structural economic problems endemic to the Arab world came to a head prior to the events in 2011.
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Before 2011, some Arab countries such as Egypt and Tunisia were in fact experiencing higher economic growth rates than they had a decade earlier, with an increase of approximately 5 percent per annum; considerably above European rates, but low by the standards of emerging market economies such as China and India. 12 As can be seen in the Figure 1 , together with progress in economic reforms and rises in oil prices, the MENA region as a whole and countries under dictators such as Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and Egypt achieved notable growth rates of real GDP over the last decade before the Arab Spring. Between 2000 and 2010, the region experienced its strongest per capita growth since the 1970s oil crisis, but it still lagged behind those of the emerging market economies in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. 13 The influx of oil wealth after the periodic booms since the 1973 oil crisis has also facilitated enormous investments in physical and social infrastructure and positively affected progress in basic development indicators. 14 Moreover, as is shown in Table 1 Despite the relatively higher economic growth rates in the last decade and rapid progress in HDI over the past three decades, the socio-economic problems have continued to centre on rising unemployment rates, particularly among youth, unequal wealth distribution, non-competitive economic structure, and unresponsiveness of the economies to the needs of changing demographic structures. Combined with rising life expectancy, a declining infant mortality rate and the increasing birth rates, the region has experienced an unprecedented boom in its youth population, which has dramatically changed its demographic profile over the last few decades. In many countries in the region, almost three-quarters of the population is under the age of thirty. 16 Together with greater female participation in the labour market, this changing demographic trend has put enormous pressure on labour markets, social services and social stability as well.
However, despite the relatively higher but unimpressive growth rates -compared to the emerging market economies of Asia and Central and East Europe -the pace of job creation in the region has not kept up with the growth of the labour force in the last few decades. Moreover, during the years between 1996 and 2006, the labour force in the region grew three times as much annually as in the rest of developing world, culminating in a high level of unemployment and one of the largest rates of youth unemployment in the world. 17 To give an example, one in two people of the working age population in the region is either unemployed or not actively engaged in the labour market at all 18 . In fact, among the developed and developing regions the MENA region has witnessed the lowest share of employed workforce in the working-age population (see Figure 2 ).
Over time, the demographic profile of the region has not only become younger and unemployed, but it has also grown more educated and politically demanding. Despite reservations about the quality of education, expected schooling in Arab states has increased from 8.0 in 1980 to 11.4 in 2010 with an annualized rate of 1.2%, compared to Asia/Pacific (1.0%) and Latin America (1.0%) (See Table 2 ). Combined with the success in enhancing access to education and narrowing gender gaps in educational attainment, this quantitative improvement in schooling has resulted in a revolution of aspirations. 19 The relationship between the progress in schooling and the change in popular expectations is also essential to understanding the context from which 
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political change originates. As Kuhn 20 has argued with the rise of schooling and educational level in the Arab world, people have become more politically aware and demanding. Drawing on a survey of young people in Egypt (SYPE, 2009) he reveals that there was a relatively weaker but still sizable link between level of schooling and individuals' proclivity to discuss politics. 21 In fact, the MENA is not the only region that has experienced these demographic pressures over the last several decades, but the irony is that while its demographic profile is transforming, the region's economic structure has remained unresponsive to the growing needs of its population. In most of the Arab economies the state is the predominant economic actor, surpassing all independent economic sectors. Despite notable improvements after the implementation of structural adjustment reforms, often recommended by international financial institutions, the states, as Henry and Springborg 22 argues, have remained "hesitant to transform their statedominated, inward-looking economies into outward-oriented ones in which private sectors would serve as the engines of growth". The functioning of these economic systems has heavily depended on government subsidies, economic control and various uncompetitive practices. As measured by economic indicators such as the comparative share of employment, total output and credit, states have dominated "private sectors to a degree unmatched by any other developing regions. 23 The states have continued to play a significant role in providing essentials of life such as jobs, food, shelter, energy and other public services as well, and working with the ruling elites and the narrow clienteles, the centralized bureaucratic systems have failed to deliver economic prosperity and social justice to citizens. 24 The deeply-rooted socio-economic problems outlined above were inseparably linked and combined with sets of political grievances that primarily originated from the widening gap between regimes and publics in the Arab world. The Arab Spring has also been a call for dignity, freedom and responsive governance as much as a wave of reaction to the worsening economic conditions. The events have thus been a reaction to longstanding policies of unaccountable, humiliating and increasingly predatory regimes. 25 In Tunisia, one popular chant was: 'We can live on bread and water alone but not with RCD` (Ben Ali's ruling party). In Egypt, one of the protest groups was called 'We are all Khaled Said' which was named after a young Egyptian man who was beaten to death by the security forces in June, 2010, and after the overthrow of Mubarak's 30-year rule, millions of Egyptians flooded the streets to celebrate the revolution, chanting a popular slogan: "Raise your head up high, you're an Egyptian".
In general terms, the roots of growing political discontent have primarily lied at the core of two endemic problems of the region: a freedom deficit and widespread corruption. In terms of freedom, democracy and participatory governance, the Arab countries have been notoriously bad compared to those of other developing countries in Latin America, East Asia, Eastern Europe and 
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even Central Asia. As a group of Arab intellectuals have stressed in the Arab Human Development Report 26 , the wave of democracy which swept most of Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s and Eastern European and many of Central Asian countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s has barely affected the Arab world. Although democracy and human rights have been legally accepted and codified in constitutions and government pronouncements, de facto implementation of democratic principles has been generally neglected and intentionally disregarded. As displayed in Figure 3 , the strikingly low level of freedom in the region can also be confirmed by the World Bank's Voice and Accountability indicator. Over the last decade or so, the MENA region has substantially lagged behind other developing regions in terms of voice and accountability. Whereas the region as a whole experienced the second lowest score after former Soviet Union countries in 1998, it received the worst scoring in 2010, lagging behind all other developing regions. Moreover, out of seven world regions, the MENA was the only one which experienced a considerable deterioration in voice and accountability indicators over the last 12 years before the uprisings. The MENA countries vary substantially in their state structures and political capacities, for example in terms of their regime types and the extent to which their citizens have basic rights of freedom of expression and freedom of association as well as the right to participate in free and competitive elections. In respect to these political parameters, the region, in general terms, consists of three major types of regime: praetorian republics, monarchies and "ethno-religious democracies". 27 What makes this tripartite categorisation of the MENA states significant for the Arab Spring is that most severe and full-scale demonstrations have occurred in the praetorian republics, such as Libya, Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Tunisia in which the general public enjoys very limited "voice and accountability" in comparison to monarchies, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, and democracies (see Figure 4) . What is also striking about Figure 4 is the notable decline of "voice and accountability throughout the region except Israel, Turkey, Algeria, Iraq, the West Bank and Gaza. Along with the freedom deficit and low level of "voice and accountability" throughout the region, anger over the perceived corruption of ruling elites and government officials was also another political factor which brought people out into the streets. Although the region is not thoroughly homogenous, it, with some variation across countries, consistently remains below the world median in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). 29 Despite the official calls to root out corruption, MENA countries, particularly the Arab states, had a slight improvement in the control of corruption in the last 14 years before the Arab Spring, from the 46.3 percentile in 1996 to 47.6 percentile in 2010. 30 The anger over perceived corruption and calls for rooting it out of the Arab world has also been noticeable in a number of opinion surveys conducted in the wake of the uprisings. As reported in Figure 5 , in sixteen of eighteen Arab countries surveyed by YouGovCambridge 31 , a large majority of the 260,000 respondents gave priority to the corruption as the most important problem facing their country, with the exceptions of Palestinian territories where the Arab-Israeli conflict retains its priority over other issues To sum up, rather than a single driving factor, a combination of longstanding socioeconomic and socio-political problems afflicting the Arab world constituted a common casual motivation behind the uprisings that swept through the region since early 2011. Coupled with the further deterioration of economic conditions due to the global financial crisis of 2008-9 and food price increases, these longstanding socio-economic and socio-political problems stated above came to a head prior to the events of 2011, triggering the tide of mass protests across the region. Despite the common motivations shared by those participating in the various uprisings, the outcomes varied from country to country depending on a combination of factors such as the government response, the role of security forces, foreign intervention, the ethnic and sectarian makeup of society and the politico-institutional characteristics of state structure.
The regimes' reaction to the rebellions was critical in shaping how the events unfolded. While in some cases decisive government reaction, at least for now, quelled rebellions by force or 
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seemingly pacified them through relatively non-coercive means, in others it aggravated the uprisings and deepened political, ethnic and sectarian divisions even further. For instance, in Tunisia where it all began, the response of Ben Ali's regime was slow and inefficient, presumably because the regime was taken by surprise in the wake of the ever-growing protests across the country, culminating in the relatively peaceful overthrow of Ben Ali after 23 years of rule 32 . In contrast, Qaddafi's regime in Libya reacted quickly and decisively by undertaking violent measures against its citizens, which prolonged its survival but further fuelled popular anger at the regime and later invited outside intervention. In a similar vein, regime violence in Syria has not only further eroded the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the public and triggered further attacks on security forces but has also made Syria more internationally isolated than ever, running the risk of a progressive loss of regime authority over various parts of country. 33 Along with the protection of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) troops, the regime in Bahrain reasserted its control over the country but the violent crackdown against protesters brought no winners in real terms but rather the further polarisation of a "society which has already divided along sectarian lines and serious questions about the island's stability". 34 In fact, the success of the uprisings was partly due to the behaviour of the regimes which was a matter of leader's choice and personal character to a certain extent, but heavily depended on other factors, such as the role and the position adopted by the army and security forces during the uprisings, the ability of the regime to retain its key allies and societal base, and foreign intervention as well. To a greater extent, the regimes' capacity to maintain the loyalty of state institutions, particularly the army and security services, was instrumental in the success or failure of the rebellions. 35 In the wake of the uprisings, Arab militaries adopted one of three different stances: (1) to stand aside and ease the transition; (2) to stand by the regime and obstruct any farreaching political change; or (3) to split and be part of the civil war. In Tunisia and Egypt, where the regimes were toppled in a relatively peaceful way without civil war and foreign intervention as occurred in Libya, the armed forces maintained awkward neutrality and did not crush the protests which facilitated the overthrow of the widely unpopular leaders. In Tunisia where the uprisings relied on large-scale social consensus against the regime, the army opted to stand aside, while the regime was backed by the police and Presidential Guard. In particular, the refusal of the Tunisian army chief of staff, General Rachid Ammar, to open fire on protesters, was a turning point which was instrumental in driving Ben Ali out. 36 Similarly, in Egypt, where demonstrators represented a broad spectrum of social classes, except for the wealthy elites that favoured the regime, the army took a rather ambivalent stance, "purportedly standing with the people while at the same time being an integral part of the regime they were confronting". 37 Yet, it eventually eased the transition process by refusing to suppress the demonstrations.
In contrast to the case of Tunisia and Egypt, the uprisings in Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen also reflected the deeply-rooted fragmentation of societies along sectarian, ethnic and tribal lines, which represents the darker side of the popular uprisings unleashed by the uprisings. Particularly, in Syria and Bahrain, sectarian politics have been critical in shaping the unfolding of events and the fate of the regimes. In Syria, the security forces have remained relatively unified and loyal to Assad's regime due to the selection of its member and top officers, mostly from the Alawite and other minority groups in Syria. Moreover, since the uprisings began, the regime has deliberately and cynically linked the fate of Alawites with its own by provoking the sense of insecurity among the pro-regime Alawite community who had been targets of religious discrimination and marginalised in economic and social terms in past centuries. 38 Similarly, the security forces in Bahrain which includes a great number of foreigners from Jordan, Yemen, Syria and Pakistan also remained loyal to the regime but not due to sectarian relations but rather to adherence to the ruling family. However, in both cases sectarian politics came to the surface in the wake of the uprisings which also manifested itself in YouGov's 39 survey (see Figure 6 ). While in Syria, 75% of Sunni and 43% of Shi'a (Alawite) respondents support the protests, in Bahrain, on the contrary, 70% of Shi'a and 33% of Sunnis support the uprisings against the Sunni-minority ruling royal family. In Libya and Yemen, where security forces had been rewarded with privileges and preferential treatments for faithfully serving the regime as an instrument for social control and punishment, the armed forces split and fought alongside the rebel groups against forces loyal to the regime. In Libya, particularly due to the weak institutional state structure, the security and intelligence apparatus easily fragmented. 40 Shortly after the outbreak of the uprising, some army units and senior officials such as Gadhafi's interior minister, General Abdul Fatah Younis, and former intelligence chief, Musa Kusa, joined the rebellion and fought with unorganised rebel groups. Despite defections in the military and security forces, Gadhafi, as Dalacoura 41 asserts, "retained at least the acquiescence of significant social and political elements, and his overthrow might not have been possible without foreign intervention". Elsewhere, in Jordan, Oman and Saudi Arabia where protests were relatively small-scale and the level of violence was low, there was no fragmentation in the state apparatus and security service, and the uprisings could not coalesce into a country-wide movement for social change in a real sense.
Concluding Remarks
To sum up, in the wake of the Arab Spring, a widespread tendency revealed itself amongst columnists and some scholars that the uprisings came into being as a result of factors such as the spread of modern information and communication technologies (ICT) and social media networks, as well as the globalisation of democratic values and globally-orientated and digital-savvy youth as primary agents of change. To be sure, all of these factors seem to have played a considerable role in triggering as well as contributing to the uprisings across the region, but neither one is fully convincing without an in-depth look into similar sets of socio-economic and socio-political problems underpinning the domestic politics of Arab states for near half a century. As a range of diverse but interconnected events have developed in distinct ways in particular places, it appears that despite the common motivations beneath the surface of the events, their outcomes vary from country to country depending on a combination of factors such as the government response, the
